◆ ◆ In the future, more cuts will be vertical as nations realize this is the only way to achieve real savings and to protect their most desired capabilities. Connected Forces Initiatives (CFI). These will require significantly more emphasis and resources than today.
◆ ◆ Uncoordinated national cuts are hard to anticipate and measure at NATO. There is no mechanism for early consultation on cuts, and no method within the NATO Defense Planning Process to track, collate, and manage cutbacks.
Cuts in resources for most European militaries have meant acceptable belt-tightening across agencies and infrastructure, but these cuts have also brought further trimming to already anemic investment programs.
Traditional "salami slicing" of training and exercise budgets of nondeploying operational forces allowed resources to be concentrated on deployed or deploying forces. However, the impact has become substantial across NATO: more and more forces becoming less ready or not available at all-a slow hollowing out of the overall force.
A substantial backlog of maintenance, multinational unit training, and personnel readiness is being added to deferred research and procurement. Collectively, this 
Transatlantic Defense Capabilities Trends Toward 2020
Looking to 2020 and beyond, it is hard to identify new Smart Defense is described as having three components.
The first goal is to improve NATO and national efforts at prioritizing defense investments. The focus is to encour- The goal is to broaden and deepen cooperation wherever practicable, while preserving the essential principle of assured access to collective assets by participating nations.
The third goal is to create a foundation for specialization by design rather than realizing it by default as members are forced to divest capabilities, or to allow them to fade into unusable obsolescence for lack of investment. The decision by the Netherlands in 2011 to eliminate the last of its armored forces is a good example.
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Without consultation at NATO-none was required and no Alliance mechanism is provided to do so in the course of national budgetary reviews-The Hague determined the only way to achieve sufficient cost reductions was the vertical elimination of entire capabilities rather than to continue the horizontal haircut approach across all capabilities. For the Alliance, however, there are now five members without armored forces, which illustrates the creeping process of specialization by default.
The Smart Defense challenge is daunting. This is Finally, nations prefer national versus collective capabilities to assure access to them should they be needed for national purposes. Assured access has been a point of contention in crisis response with respect to past collective capability investments. These motives account for a lot of protectiondriven inefficiencies that may well thwart Smart Defense.
Follow-through on the Lisbon Critical Capabilities Commitment (LCCC
However, the depth of the financial crisis provides an opportunity to break down these obstacles. Auster- One concern is that in a period of sustained economic turmoil marked by well-known perils-rampant inflation, stagflation, recession, and joblessness-nations will be driven away from cooperation by competing demands. Allies would be reluctant to pool capabilities and industries.
They would be inclined to maintain wasteful duplication and less modern, poorly trained, and less interoperable forces. Behind this façade, they could argue that they are participating in the Alliance-so long as they do not have to demonstrate real capabilities. Yet they would be moving away from cooperation precisely when they need it most.
Another concern is that transatlantic relationship apathy will grow on both sides of the Atlantic in the absence of an overt threat to territory or Allies' stability. They are also mundane stuff that attracts no political champions in capitals without steady exposure to their worth and strong advocacy from military leaders.
A third concern is that NATO will become a shell while the United States deepens bilateral ties with the handful of European Allies willing and capable of cooperation on missions around NATO' s neighborhood.
Counting the United States, only eight members have substantial forces and only one of these, France, has the size and financial potential to provide sizable forces on a sustained basis. The United Kingdom can provide only a brigade and equivalent air and naval resources, though it has many highend capabilities, including nuclear submarines and aircraft.
Germany has evolved into a specialized military, fully capable when faced with the unlikely situation of self-defense but otherwise intent on low-end, mainly nonlethal operations.
The majority of NATO members can contribute little, and then only if they remain dedicated to programs like the NRF.
NATO members, the United States in particular, cannot afford to let these scenarios erode transatlantic interoperability in the future. It is the lifeblood of our respective nations' defense and security-none more than the United States of America. 
Notes
1 The LCCC capabilities are full capability of the Afghan Mission Network; implementation of an ambitious counter-improvised explosive device action plan; improvement of airlift and sealift capabilities; implementation of collective logistics contracts; missile defense; full capability of the NATO Cyber Defense Package; development of NATO support for stabilization and reconstruction operations; full implementation of an interoperable Air Command and Control System; development of a coordinated joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability; and deployment of an Alliance Ground Surveillance system. 2 The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters is located at SHAPE but is not a NATO-approved organization or part of the Command Structure requirement. The United States is the framework nation and provides the largest staff contingent and funding support.
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